Domestic Relations by Vermont, Venable
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 14 Issue 1 Article 11 
Fall 1961 
Domestic Relations 
Venable Vermont 
Gaines & Vermont (Spartanburg and Inman, SC) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Venable Vermont, Domestic Relations, 14 S. C. L. Rev. 33 (1961-1962). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
VENABLE VERMONT*
During the review period the South Carolina Supreme Court
dealt with five cases involving divorce, one case involving
rights to real estate arising out of the legitimacy of a child,
and one case involving conversion of an automobile owned by
the husband sold by the wife in his absence.
The reviewer found io decisions in the field by any of the
United States Courts during the review period.
Judicial Decisions
In Davis v. Davis1 the Court reviewed an order below va-
cating a default judgment for divorce and permitting the de-
fendant, now the respondent, to amend her answer or other-
wise plead to the verified complaint. The attorney represent-
ing the husband brought action for divorce and then had
the wife sign an unverified answer admitting the allegations
and joining in the prayer for divorce. The answer was not
filed and the attorney averred in the proceeding at hand that
it was not so intended but was merely denominated as a
"statement," having been read and explained to the wife in
the presence of a witness prior to her signing. The attorney
made an affidavit of default without any averment that the
defendant had failed to answer or appear. The subsequent
order of reference recited that respondent in her answer had
admitted the allegations of the complaint. The master took
testimony of the husband and two other witnesses apparently
in the form of affidavits, without answers, questions, or cross
examination, and recommended a decree of divorce, reporting
that the defendant is in default having failed to answer, demur
or give notice of appearance, etc. A subsequent decree was
filed. The appellant had no notice of the application for order
of reference, or motion, or application for the judgment, or
the filing of it. Subsequently a petition to vacate the decree
was heard and granted, supported by affidavits of respond-
ents and others, showing prima facie that there had been no
desertion by the wife and that the parties had lived together as
husband and wife, except for a brief interval or intervals of
*Gaines & Vermont, Spartanburg and Inman, S. C.
1. 236 S. C. 277, 113 S. E. 2d 819 (1960).
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:separation, until the night before the commencement of the
.action, and that after the commencement the husband had
assured his wife that the matter had been dropped and they
lived together for some time. The affidavit of default and
order of reference were dated at times when the couple was
living together. Counter affidavits were in conflict with those
of the respondent.
The court below held the proceedings fatally irregular for
lack of notice of the application for order of reference, the
reference and the application for the decree. Other grounds
for vacation of the judgment were not passed upon by the
Court.
The Court on appeal held that the respondent had properly
moved to vacate the judgment, that any "mistake"2 was that
of the husband and his attorney rather than that of the re-
spondent in retaining and not filing the answer and in rep-
resenting to the court that she was in default, which might
reasonably have been held to be extrinsic fraud on her part
and upon the court. The Court added that the record indi-
cated that this was a bona fide mistake of counsel and merely
constructive rather than actual fraud. As might be pre-
sumed, other attorneys represented the husband in the present
proceeding and appeal. The contention that the answer of
the respondent was a nullity because it was not verified was
'held to have been waived by the actions of counsel for the
plaintiff.
The most interesting point of the whole case is the fact
that appellant attacks the constitutionality of the statute
which requires a desertion for one year to constitute grounds
for divorce, 3 as was done in Hollift v. Holliday.4 As in the
2. CODE OF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 10-1213 (1952). "The court
may, in its discretion and upon such terms as may be just, at any time
within one year after notice thereof relieve a party from a judgment, order
or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in any pro-
ceeding. And whenever any proceeding taken by a party fails to conform
in any respect to the provisions of this Code the court may, in like manner
and upon like terms, permit an amendment of such proceeding so as to
make it conformable thereto."
3. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 20-101 (1952) amended. "No
divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be granted except upon one or
more of the following grounds, to-wit: (1) Adultery; (2) Desertion for a
period of one year; (3) Physical cruelty; or (4) Habitual drunkenness.
Habitual drunkenness shall be construed to include such drunkenness caused
by the use of any narcotic drug." The complaint is that the requirement
-for desertion be for one year is in (Footnote 3 continued on page 35)
4. 235 S. C. 246, 111 S. E. 2d 205 (1959).
[Vol. 14
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Holliday case the point was not raised in the court below, and
would not be considered on appeal, but incidentally the Court
pointed out that appellant seems to concede that the statutory
grounds of desertion for one year did not exist in the case,
and that will be for trial hereafter, if made an issue. The
Court found no benefit to the wife by reason of estoppel, she
presumably having failed to receive support during the one
year of separation. The Court pointed out that collusion will
not be allowed in a divorce proceeding and that no rights of
innocent third parties had intervened, other than the giving
of a mortgage by the husband without dower (upon which
the wife had agreed to renounce dower) as further supporting
grounds for the decision.
Since it was not expressly raised on the record, the Court
did not examine and made no finding upon the propriety of
the undertaking of the original counsel to represent both
plaintiff and defendant in the action.
In Lee v. Lee5 the wife appeals an adverse decision in her
husband's action for a divorce based upon the grounds of
adultery, claiming that the charge of adultery was not estab-
lished by the preponderance of the evidence and that the
amount of support was totally inadequate. The court below
had heard the evidence without a reference, and in reviewing
the facts the court held that the charge had been proven suf-
ficiently to support the decree, holding that a preponderance
of the evidence was made out by one witness who viewed a
single act of adultery on the part of the wife, noting other
facts evidencing a predisposition to adultery on the part of
the erring wife. The Court carefully reviewed the earnings
of the parties and sustained the award for support for the
two minor children left with the wife by the order of custody
below. The Court found that the matter was within the dis-
cretion of the trial court and found no abuse thereof, pointing
out that the adjudication might be modified in the face of
changed circumstances and conditions in the future.
In the case of Sherbert v. SherbertP the husband had
brought an action for divorce alleging desertion and adultery,
conflict with Article 17, Section 3, Constitution of South Carolina,
Amended 1949, "Divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall be allowed
on grounds of adultery, desertion, physical cruelty or habitual drunken-
ness." The Constitution places no time limit on desertion, the one year
requirement having been established by act of the General Assembly.
5. 237 S. C. 533, 118 S. E. 2d 171 (1961).
6. 237 S. C. 449, 117 S. E. 2d 715 (1960).
1961]
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seeking custody of the children. The wife brought a cross
action seeking divorce on the ground of physical cruelty, ask-
ing separate maintenance and custody of the children. On
reference the master found that neither party under the proof
was entitled to a divorce, recommending that separate main-
tenance to the wife be denied and that custody of the children
be given the husband, with visitation privileges to the wife.
On exceptions to the master's report the county court held
the wife had established her charges of physical cruelty and
was entitled to a divorce on that ground. It is interesting to
note that while the parties were seeking their divorce the
children's court was entertaining a proceeding relative to
their custody, and a third child was born prior to the hearing
before the master. The county court left the question of the
custody of the two older children to the children's court and
held that the mother was entitled to the custody of the third
child, requiring the husband to pay $10.00 a week for the
support of the wife and that child. On appeal the husband
did not challenge the denial of the divorce sought by him, but
merely questioned the holding that his wife was entitled to a
divorce on the ground of physical cruelty and whether there
was error in granting her separate maintenance.
The Court on appeal held that since the action was in
equity it was at liberty to review the facts and weigh the
evidence upon disagreement by the master and the county
judge and determine its own view of the evidence.
The Court gave consideration to the master's opportunity to
see the witnesses and hear the testimony. The parties were
married when he was thirty-six and she fourteen years of age.
The Court rejected the wife's contention of the physical
cruelty sufficient to ground a divorce, and affirmed the hold-
ing of the master, concluding there was insufficient evidence
to support the divorce.
The decree below was reversed as to divorce and alimony
and since there was no exception to the portion of the decree
holding that the father should support the child, the case was
remanded to the county court for proceedings in accordance
with the views of the opinion.
Ortowski v. OrtowskiP originated in a divorce proceeding
brought by the wife alleging physical cruelty. The court
below referred the matter to the master who issued a report
7. 237 S. C. 499, 117 S. E. 2d 860 (1961).
[Vol. 14
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recommending that plaintiff be granted a divorce, that the
defendant be awarded custody of the two older children and
the plaintiff have custody of the youngest whose paternity the
father questioned. He recommended that the wife be given
approximately $10,000.00 of the accumulated savings, that
the remaining $18,000.00 be placed in trust for the use of the
youngest child with the wife being given the right to withdraw
$125.00 a month for the child's support, and that the award
to the plaintiff be considered alimony in bulk. Upon excep-
tions, the circuit court modified the master's report slightly
as to the disposition of certain furniture. From that order the
husband served notice of intention to appeal and shortly there-
after gave notice of withdrawing the intention and consented
to the order. Four days later the plaintiff married a man who
obviously had been her paramour prior to the divorce pro-
ceedings.
Shortly thereafter the defendant filed a petition reciting
these facts and prayed for an order setting aside the decree
on the ground of after discovered evidence. At various points
in the proceedings the court had impounded certain funds be-
longing to the parties, and did so again on the motion to
vacate.
Certain affidavits were filed alleging that the plaintiff had
engaged in adultery with the man she subsequently married.
Others tended to impugn the fitness of the plaintiff to have
custody of the children. Proper allegations were made that
the evidence was unknown to him until after the final decree
of divorce; that he had exercised due diligence; that the evi-
dence was material and could not have been timely discovered
by him through the exercise of due diligence.
The circuit court refused the motion to vacate and upon
appeal the defendant alleged an abuse of discretion, and that
the court below should have taken into consideration the in-
terest of the state in an action involving the sanctity of mar-
riage.
The Court reviewed the requisites for securing a new trial
based upon after discovered evidence.8
8. In a motion for a new trial based upon after-discovered evidence,
the moving party must show (1) that the evidence is such as will
probably change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) that it has
been discovered since the trial, (3) that it could not have been dis-
covered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence, (4) that it
is material to the issue, and (5) that it is not merely cumulative or
impeaching. McCabe v. Sloan, 184 S. C. 158, 191 S. E. 905.
1961]
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The Court pointed out that the defendant had not used due
diligence in discovering the evidence, since it was completely
available to him prior to the trial. Thus there was no abuse
of discretion amounting to an error of law on the part of the
circuit court.
The defendant on appeal maintained that in passing upon
the motion for a new trial upon after discovered evidence con-
cerning a divorce, the circuit court should have taken into
consideration the interest of the state and that the sanctity
of marriage and the public interest are involved.
The Court reviewed its two prior decisions in Fogle v. Mc-
Donald" and Grant v. Grant'0 and declared that those two de-
cisions in no wise contravene the established rules governing
motions for new trial based upon after discovered evidence, af-
firming the court below.
The decision of Mitchell v. Smyser" had its genesis in a
partition proceeding involving real estate in which the plain-
tiff alleged an interest in such property by reason of descent
from her father, Wellington Perkins, who died intestate.
The defendant claimed title through James and Walter
Perkins, admittedly sons of Wellington Perkins, alleging they
were the sole heirs at law.
The plaintiff sought to establish a showing of a common law
marriage between her father and Martha Perkins. The cir-
cuit court found that Martha Perkins was not the wife of
Wellington Perkins. The plaintiff appealed. The matter be-
ing at law the Court was not at liberty to pass on conflicting
evidence but merely reviewed the circuit decree and deter-
mined there was evidence reasonably warranting the factual
conclusions reached by the circuit judge and affirmed the de-
cision below taking judicial notice of the fact that divorces
were not permitted in South Carolina at that time and holding
that since the plaintiff admitted that James and Walter Per-
kins were lawful heirs of Wellington Perkins and since Wel-
lington's first wife survived him, Martha could not have been
his lawful wife and her children should not have been lawful
heirs.
In Collins v. Collins'12 the plaintiff wife brought a divorce
action alleging desertion and physical cruelty and serving
9. 159 S. C. 506, 157 S. E. 830 (1931).
10. 233 S. C. 433, 105 S. E. 2d 523 (1958).
11. 236 S. C. 332, 114 S. E. 2d 226 (1960).
12. 237 S. C. 230, 116 S. E. 2d 839 (1960).
[Vol. 14
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the summons by publication. The husband-appellant filed a
notice of motion supported by various affidavits and exhibits
to change the venue of the action from Kershaw county to
Horry county upon the grounds that he was a resident of
Horry and not Kershaw county. The motion was refused by
the circuit judge and this appeal followed. The husband was
tried and convicted previously for failure to support his wife
and child.'3 Prior to the indictment the wife had brought an
action for divorce and incidental relief in "The Juvenile, Do-
mestic Relations and Special Court of Kershaw County"
which was dismissed without prejudice to the wife, "to bring
an action for divorce in Horry County or to file such other
actions as she may be advised."
Thereafter an action for separate maintenance and support
of the wife and child was brought by the wife in the Kershaw
County Court which terminated in a voluntary nonsuit upon
objection to jurisdiction and filing of a motion for change of
venue. Thereafter in November of 1959, the wife instituted
an action for divorce in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry
county. The sheriff was unable to serve the defendant or
to determine his whereabouts and the action was subsequently
on motion dismissed. The action was begun February 12,
1960, in Kershaw county.
The motion for a change of venue in the instant case was
supported by affidavits of appellant asserting that he has been
a resident of Horry county since he was a small boy, and
that he is presently a student at the University of Georgia.
Other supporting evidence showed that the husband considered
his residence to be Horry county and at least during some
of the time he was absent partly in this State and partly in
North Carolina.
The appellant contends he is a resident of Horry county
and the action should be tried in such county pursuant to
Section 20-106 of the 1952 Code.14 The respondent wife con-
tends the action should be tried in Kershaw county where
13. See State v. Collins, 235 S. C. 65, 110 S. E. 2d 270, cert. denied,
361 U. S. 895, 4 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1959).
14. Venue in divorce cases is fixed by Section 20-106 of the 1952 Code:
"Actions for divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be tried in the
county (a) in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement
of the action, (b) in which the plaintiff resides if the defendant is a non-
resident or after due diligence cannot be found or (c) in which the parties
last resided together as husband and wife unless the plaintiff is a non-
resident in which case it must be brought in the county in which the de-
fendant resides."
19611
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she resides for the reason that appellant after due diligence
cannot be found in Horry county.
The Court found that due diligence had been used in the
attempt by the deputy sheriff to serve the appellant and
pointed out that one of the prior actions had been dismissed
because of ineffectual service. The Court found the evidence
conclusive that an effort was made to locate the appellant in
the county of his alleged residence, and being unable to do so
under the peculiar facts of this case, the respondent has the
right to bring the action in Kershaw county.
In Barber v. Carolina Auto Sales15 the plaintiff appeals an
order of nonsuit in an action for actual and punitive damages
for the alleged conversion of an automobile.
The plaintiff, a sergeant in the army, owned a 1950 Olds-
mobile registered in his name. In October, 1958, he was trans-
ferred to Germany, leaving his automobile in charge of his
wife for family use. On January 5, 1959, while plaintiff was
still in Germany the wife, without his knowledge or consent,
traded the 1950 Oldsmobile to the defendant for a 1956 Olds-
mobile, using the plaintiff's automobile as a down payment,
giving a mortgage on the 1956 Oldsmobile for the balance of
the purchase price and registering it in her name. Shortly
thereafter the defendant sold the 1950 Oldsmobile to a third
party. A few months later plaintiff, upon information that his
wife was going out with other men and neglecting his chil-
dren, secured an emergency leave from his commanding offi-
cer in Germany, returning to Columbia on March 23,'1959,
where he learned for the first time that his car had been
sold by his wife, who was then working in a Columbia restau-
rant, and that his children were at the home of his parents
in West Virginia. On the night of his return he went to the
place of business of the defendant to see if he could locate his
automobile, but was unable to do so, and the next day asked his
wife to drive him to West Virginia to see about his children,
who were ill. She drove him in the 1956 Oldsmobile. Upon
arriving in West Virginia the plaintiff found it necessary to
hospitalize his children and while there brought suit against
his wife for divorce. The couple stayed approximately two
and one-half weeks in West Virginia. The wife drove him
back to Columbia. A week after his return he consulted coun-
sel in reference to his automobile, and thereafter on April
15. 236 S. C. 594, 115 S. E. 2d 291 (1960).
[Vol. 14
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20, 1959, this suit for conversion was commenced. Shortly
after the action was brought, a representative of a finance
company which purchased the conditional sales contract,
sought to have the appellant assume the indebtedness and
make the payments on the 1956 Oldsmobile, which he declined
to do. The car was thereupon repossessed. The county court
found no evidence that plaintiff ever drove his wife's auto-
mobile or assumed any dominion or control over it. The non-
suit was granted on the grounds that the wife had implied
authority to trade the automobile, and if not, the appellant
had, on returning from Germany, acquiesced in and ratified
the transaction.
Pointing out that the wife is not the agent of her husband
by virtue of the marital relationship, but that the husband
may make her his agent and be bound by her acts as such
when the agency is expressed, implied or ostensible, or perhaps
arising by implication of law, the Court on appeal found no
agency. The Court further pointed out that the fact that her
husband is away from home does not clothe his wife with
implied authority to sell and dispose of his property as if it
were her own.
The Court further held that whether or not there had been
a ratification of the unauthorized act by an acceptance or
retention of the benefits thereof is a question of fact for
the jury and reversed, remanding for a new trial.
Legislation
In its 1961 session the General Assembly passed several
acts in the field of Domestic Relations. Section 15-1012, CODE
OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952), was amended by an
act16 to provide that testimony given in investigations of in-
corrigible and destitute children by certain municipal courts
need not be signed by the witnesses when the testimony is
recorded by a sworn stenographer.
Section 15-1184, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952),
was amended 17 to correct a typographical error striking the
word "case" and inserting in lieu thereof the word "cause."
The section itself deals with making additional parties to cases
under the jurisdiction of children's court of certain counties.
Section 20-1, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952),
pertaining to those who may lawfully contract matrimony was
16. Act No. 6 of 1961.
17. Act No. 58 of 1961.
1961]
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amended18 by substituting the words "mentally incompetent
persons" for the words "idiots" and "lunatics."
A Controversial Act
An Act' 9 effective May 4, 1961, has given a great many
lawyers some concern. Its title claims that its purpose is to
amend Section 19-111, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
(1952), relating to renunciation of dower so as to simplify
the provisions thereof; and to require the official seal of the
officer before whom the renunciation was made. The amended
section itself reads as follows:
Any woman who has an inchoate right of dower in any
lands in this State, whether she be of lawful age or minor,
may renounce and relinquish her right of dower by ac-
knowledging it in writing before any officer of this State,
or of the state in which the renunciation is executed, or of
the United States, who is authorized by law to administer
oaths. The officer shall append to the writing his certifi-
cate in the form prescribed by Section 19-114, and affix
his official seal, if any. [Emphasis supplied.]
When recorded in the county where the real estate is lo-
cated, the renunciation shall be effective to convey away,
bar and terminate the dower right of the woman, al-
though she has executed no deed of conveyance for that
purpose.
(Section 19-114 merely provides a standard form of certifi-
cate for the renunciation of dower.)
Whether or not this statute was intended to repeal Section
49-6, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952), which pro-
vides that the lack of a Notary Public seal affixed to an in-
strument shall not render his acts invalid if the official title
of the Notary be affixed thereto, is questionable.
Certainly a Notary has an official seal and the implication
is that the amendment requires the affixation of the official
seal wherever a renunciation of dower is taken. Certainly
the careful practitioner would insist upon the affixation of a
seal to every dower until the General Assembly amends the
statute to clarify the matter and ratifies whatever dowers
may have been taken in the interim period without the affixa-
tion of a seal.
18. Act No. 61 of 1961.
19. Act No. 217 of 1961.
[Vol. 14
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Another Act 20 provides for the renunciation of dower in
regard to land subject to conveyance or mortgage by an at-
torney in fact by the endorsement upon the power of attorney
of a certificate in a form set up by statute by which the wife
renounces dower upon the premises described in the power
of attorney or by specifically identifying the power of attorney
if the renunciation is in a separate document.
Section 10-451, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952),
as amended, provides, inter /ia, for publication of service in
actions where the defendant is a party to a proceeding for the
determinations of parental rights and is either a nonresident
or a person upon whom service cannot be had within the State
after due diligence. An amendment 2' provides for service of
process by publication upon the defendant who is a party to
an annulment proceeding or where the subject of the matter
involves the custody of minor children, support of minor chil-
dren or wife, separate maintenance, or legal separation.
A Much Needed Act
Another Act22 provides for the termination of parental
rights in regard to any child voluntarily abandoned by its
parents for a period in excess of twelve months. The act pro-
vides that any interested person, persons or agency may pe-
tition the court of competent jurisdiction in the county in
which the child resides or is residing for an order determining
whether or not the child was voluntarily abandoned. The sum-
mons and petition shall be served upon the parents of the child
and upon the child and the person or agency with whom it re-
sides in the manner provided in ordinary civil actions. There-
after the court shall hold a hearing to determine the merits
of the petition and if it finds that the child has been volun-
tarily abandoned for a period in excess of twelve months, it
may issue an order forever barring parental or guardianship
rights as to such minor and may award custody of the child
as it deems proper and said child shall be eligible for adoption.
Sections 55-741 through -747, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA (1952), establishing a detention home for children
in Spartanburg county have been repealed.23 No detention
home had ever been established under the act.
20. Act No. 244 of 1961.
21. Act No. 245 of 1961.
22. Act No. 366 of 1961.
23. Act No. 417 of 1961.
19611
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